Many experiments show that consumers consider relative price differences even when only absolute price differences are relevant from an economic perspective, a phenomenon that was denoted "relative thinking." These experiments, however, were conducted using hypothetical questions. To test whether the relative thinking bias also exists in real-world situations, a field experiment where subjects could purchase either a bagel or a bagel with cream cheese was 
Introduction
In almost every purchase decision, consumers face various alternatives, which usually differ in their characteristics and prices. Even at the same store one could usually find various types of bread, soft drinks, toothpastes, TV sets, and so on, and when considering alternative stores the number of alternatives is even larger. The same applies to services -in most places there are many restaurants to choose from and in each restaurant a variety of items on the menu, for example. Because the choice between differentiated goods or services is so common, it is very important to understand how consumers make these choices.
When a consumer faces two differentiated goods and one is preferred to the other but is also more expensive, utility maximization implies that he should compare the extra utility from using the better good, to the utility he can derive from using the price difference to consume other goods.
1 The relative price difference between the goods should not matter; only the absolute price difference matters. For example, suppose that there are two substitute goods, the price of the lesspreferred one is p, and the consumer tells us that he is exactly indifferent between the two goods when the preferred good costs p+x. Then, if the price of the less-preferred good changes to q, the consumer should be indifferent between the two goods when the preferred good costs q+x. 2 The reason is that the difference in utility between the two goods is fixed, and so is the utility the consumer can derive by using x dollars towards consumption of other goods.
3
To illustrate this idea more vividly, suppose that a consumer is indifferent between two flights, where one costs $209 and leaves at 7 am and the other costs $249 and leaves at 10 am (the consumer has to wake up a few hours before the flight in order to catch it, and is willing to pay up to $40 to sleep three more hours). Now, suppose that the consumer, a month later, has to choose again between two flights that are identical except for their departure time, and that anything else remains unchanged, except that the 7-am flight's price is $627. The consumer should be indifferent between the two flights if the 10-am flight costs $667, because he is willing to pay up to $40 for three more hours of sleep.
Product differentiation can come from many sources other than departure time; one simple example is the location in which the goods can be purchased. If one store is more conveniently located than another and the consumer is indifferent between the two when a certain good costs $20 in one store and $25 in the other, then he should also be indifferent between the two stores when buying another good that costs $270 and $275 in the two stores.
While normatively, utility maximization and well-defined preferences imply that consumers should exhibit this simple principle, several experiments showed that people often deviate from it and exhibit "relative thinking" -thinking about relative price differences in addition to absolute differences (Azar, 2004) . 4 Tversky and Kahneman (1981) , for example, asked people whether they would drive 20 minutes to save $5 on a calculator when they were going to buy a calculator and a jacket. When the calculator's price was $15 and the jacket's price was $125, 68 percent of 3 The higher price is in the preferred store, obviously, otherwise the consumer is not indifferent.
4 See Azar (2007) for a literature review, a theoretical framework and some further discussion of relative thinking, and Azar (2008) for a discussion why "relative thinking" seems to be a better terminology than "mental accounting,"
which was sometimes used to describe the same behavior.
4 the subjects were willing to drive, but when the calculator's price was $125 and the jacket's price $15, only 29 percent wanted to drive 20 minutes to save $5 on the calculator. This result was later replicated in several other studies. Mowen and Mowen (1986) showed that the effect holds similarly for student subjects and for business managers. Frisch (1993) showed that the effect holds also when only a calculator is being purchased. Ranyard and Abdel-Nabi (1993) varied the price of the second item (the jacket) and obtained similar results, and Darke and Freedman (1993) found that both the percentage discount and the absolute discount have an effect on consumer choice. Azar (2006a) showed that when subjects can choose to purchase in a store they currently visit or in a remote store, the minimal price difference for which they are willing to travel to the remote store is an increasing function of the good's price. In an experiment that included nine different price-treatments, he quantified this effect and found that people behave on average as if the value of their time is approximately proportional to the square root of the good's price. Azar (2004) showed that consumers' willingness to add for a high-quality good (over the price of a low-quality good) is higher when the good's price is higher. The quality difference was unrelated to the good's price, and therefore, from a normative perspective, the willingness to add for the higher quality should be independent of the good's price. He conducted the experiment both with undergraduate students and with participants in the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society and showed that economists also exhibit this behavior. Azar (2006b) argues that response of firms to relative thinking of consumers can explain the finding of Pratt, Wise and Zeckhauser (1979) , Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar (2001) , Sorensen (2000) and AaltoSetälä (2003) that price dispersion is positively correlated with the average price (or cost), a finding that is otherwise hard to explain from the perspective of search theory.
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The experiments described above, however, were conducted without financial incentives.
There are several possible reasons for this. One reason is that many of the researchers cited above are psychologists, and in psychology it is a common practice to conduct experiments without financial incentives. 6 Another possible reason is that the questions subjects faced were simple questions that did not require a significant amount of effort to answer correctly. Therefore, there is no apparent reason why introducing financial incentives should make responses more accurate or change them in a systematic manner. A third reason is that subjects were asked about their preferences, and since these were unknown to the experimenter, he could not reward the subjects based on how close their responses were to the correct answers (their true preferences).
The issue of whether and how financial incentives affect behavior, and in particular violations of rationality, is a controversial issue among economists and psychologists. Tversky and Kahneman (1987, p. 90) , for example, argued that "experimental findings provide little support"
for the view that "observed failures of rational models are attributable to the cost of thinking and will thus be eliminated by proper incentives." Similarly, Thaler (1994, p.155-157, 190) wrote,
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"To see whether the addition of monetary incentives would improve decision making, numerous researchers, both psychologists and economists, have run parallel experiments with and without incentives… the violations of rationality observed tend to be somewhat stronger in the incentive condition…" Later, Thaler added "Hypothetical questions appear to work well when subjects have access to their intuitions and have no particular incentive to lie," and afterwards he concluded, "… the assertion that systematic mistakes will always disappear if the stakes are large enough should be recognized for what it is -an assertion unsupported by any data."
Others, however, oppose this view and suggest that financial incentives are important in order to make experimental results reliable. Textbooks that guide beginners how to conduct economics experiments, for example, suggest "… motivate subjects by paying them in cash… Most of the payment should be sensitively linked to subjects' actions in the experiment" (Friedman and Sunder, 1994) , and argue that "… what people say they would do in hypothetical situations does
not always reflect what they actually do" (Friedman and Cassar, 2004) .
Several review articles examined the issue of financial incentives, with mixed findings (Jenkins et al., 1998; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2003) : in some cases financial incentives affect behavior and choices, while in other cases they do not. Camerer and Hogarth, for example, considered 74 experiments and found cases in which the level of incentives affected behavior, but nevertheless there was no case in which higher incentives made rationality violations disappear.
Given the controversy and the mixed results about the effect of financial incentives, and since the entire literature on relative thinking is based on experiments without financial incentives, it seemed important to test whether the bias of relative thinking exists also when financial incentives are present, or even better, in real-world situations, where decisions make a difference for the subject. Doing so is the purpose of this article.
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The article is organized as follows. The next section presents a field experiment that creates a real-world situation where relative thinking matters. People could buy a bagel or a bagel with cream cheese. The bagel's price varied between treatments, but the extra cost of the cream cheese was kept constant, thus creating the possibility of detecting relative thinking. Section 3 describes a hypothetical-scenario counterpart to the field experiment, which was used to reinforce the conclusion about the effect of financial incentives on relative thinking. Section 4 addresses the issue of the potential correlation between the willingness to pay for the bagel and for the cream cheese, and the last section discusses the implications of the findings.
A Field Experiment with Bagels and Cream Cheese
The experimental evidence for relative thinking can be stated as follows: when consumers have to choose between two differentiated goods, they consider not only the absolute price difference, but also the relative price difference, even when the latter should be irrelevant. For example, in Tversky and Kahneman (1981) , the differentiation comes from the different location of the two stores, and in Azar (2004) it comes from the characteristics of the goods (for example, the time departure of the flight). The aim in this article was therefore to create a setting that will allow subjects to choose between two differentiated products, where the differentiation between the two goods is constant and does not depend on the good's price. 7 The setting that was chosen for the experiment was to sell bagels: the low-quality good was just a bagel, and the high-quality 7 For example, the differentiation between a good with 1-year warranty and a good with 3-year warranty is not independent of the good's price, because the value of the warranty is higher when the good's price is higher. Then relative price differences are relevant and it can no longer be argued that paying attention to them expresses biased decision making. Table 1 show that they did not. Consequently, the null hypothesis that the bagel's price has no effect on the decision whether to add the cream cheese cannot be rejected. That is, consumer behavior in the experiment is consistent with rational-choice theory. The experiment failed to document a bias of relative thinking, despite the robustness of this bias in experiments involving hypothetical questions.
Replicating the results in the two buildings, in addition to increasing the sample size, has another advantage. The Tech building serves undergraduate and graduate students in various disciplines. The Kellogg building serves mostly MBA students. This implies that on average the income of buyers in the Kellogg building is much higher than that of buyers in the Tech building.
The results in both places being qualitatively similar suggest that they seem to be robust to income level variation.
The Hypothetical Scenario Counterpart
While the experimental design was chosen in a way that mimics the hypothetical scenarios used in previous studies in which relative thinking was documented, it seemed a good idea to test for relative thinking in a hypothetical scenario equivalent to the field experiment, in order to reinforce the conclusion that the introduction of financial incentives is the reason that relative Among the 378 subjects, 214 indicated that they would purchase their preferred option if they also had the choice not to buy at all. Because the sample in the field experiment includes only people who decided to make a purchase, only these 214 subjects are analyzed, in order to make the results comparable to the field experiment. As the right column in Table 1 reveals, in the high-price treatment 82.2% of the subjects wanted to pay the extra $0.20 and add the cream cheese, whereas in the low-price treatment only 72.6% wanted to do so. This difference, which is 13 statistically significant at the 5% level, is consistent with the relative thinking bias found in other hypothetical-scenario studies in the literature. Because the $0.20 addition for the cream cheese seems more significant in relative terms when compared to $0.05 than when compared to $0.30, more subjects choose to add the cream cheese when the bagel's price is $0.30. The conclusion is that the non-existence of relative thinking bias in the field experiment seems to be the result of the introduction of financial incentives and not of the specific decision problem.
To further verify the robustness of this conclusion, three regressions that include the data from both the hypothetical and the field experiments were run. The dependent variable was CHEESE (1 if the subject purchased also cream cheese, 0 if only a bagel) and the independent variables were HIGH (1 in the high-price treatment, 0 otherwise), REAL (1 in the field experiment, 0 in the hypothetical experiment), and REALHIGH (the value of REAL*HIGH).
Because HIGH captures relative thinking, the coefficient of the interaction term REALHIGH indicates the difference in relative thinking between the field and the hypothetical-scenario experiments. The coefficient of REALHIGH is negative in all three regressions (suggesting more relative thinking in the hypothetical experiment than in the field experiment), and its one-tailed pvalue is 0.045 in the OLS regression, 0.041 in the logit regression, and 0.042 in the probit regression. These results further support the conclusion that there is a statistically significant difference in relative thinking behavior between the field experiment and the hypotheticalscenario experiment. This suggests that introducing financial incentives eliminates the relative thinking behavior, at least in the context explored in this experiment, of choosing between two differentiated goods.
The Correlation between Willingness to Pay for the Bagel and for the Cream Cheese
One issue that might affect the results is the sample selection in the two price treatments. The average willingness to pay (WTP) for the bagel of people who make a purchase when the bagel's price is $0.05 is lower than the average WTP of purchasing customers when the bagel's price is $0.30. This is because the purchase decision indicates that the WTP is higher than the price, and a higher price then implies a higher average WTP. The failure to detect relative thinking in the field What is left to be done is to examine whether there is a statistically significant negative correlation between AWTP and CHEESE. Regressing CHEESE on AWTP (and a constant)
shows that the correlation is in fact positive, and is not statistically significant (the p-value of the coefficient of AWTP is between 0.298 -0.302 in logit, probit, and OLS estimations). Therefore, the hypothesis that in the field experiment there exists relative thinking which is not evident due to a counter-effect that results from negative correlation between the WTP for bagels and the WTP for cream cheese is not supported by the data.
Conclusion
A very common consumer decision problem is the choice between differentiated goods or services, making it important to understand how consumers make these choices. The evidence on relative thinking suggests that when consumers consider purchasing one of two differentiated goods, both the absolute price difference and the relative price difference affect their decision.
Similarly, as Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and others showed, when consumers consider whether to make a certain effort to save a certain amount on a good they want to buy, they are affected not only by the absolute savings but also by the savings relative to the good's price, even though the latter should be irrelevant. Many studies show this behavior, but all of them are based on hypothetical questions and do not involve financial incentives to make correct decisions.
To examine whether the relative thinking bias is robust to the introduction of financial incentives, a field experiment was conducted. Bagels served as a low-quality good, and bagels with cream cheese served as a high-quality good. The extra amount needed in order to purchase the high-quality good was kept constant, whereas the bagel's price varied across treatments.
According to the relative thinking behavior, the percentage of customers who choose to buy bagels with cream cheese should be lower when the bagel's price is lower (because the extra cost of the cream cheese relative to the bagel's price is higher). In two different replications of the experiment, however, the opposite result was obtained: a higher percentage of buyers added the cream cheese when the bagel's price was lower. The difference in the proportion of buyers adding the cream cheese in the two treatments, however, is not statistically significant. Consequently, the results in the field experiment are consistent with the prediction of rational-choice theory (which predicts that the percentage of consumers who add the cream cheese should be similar in both treatments), but not with the prediction of relative thinking.
To verify that the disappearance of relative thinking in the field experiment is due to the financial incentives that were introduced and not to other differences between the consumer decision and decisions used in previous studies (which documented relative thinking in hypothetical questions) 9 , a hypothetical-scenario version of the experiment was run. In that version, relative thinking was documented, suggesting that indeed the introduction of financial incentives seems to be the reason for the disappearance of relative thinking.
Do the results imply that relative thinking is a phenomenon that only occurs with hypothetical questions, but disappears with financial incentives? This is an intriguing question. It will be surprising to find that this is the case, given that many experiments with hypothetical questions found a significant behavior of relative thinking, and given that Camerer and Hogarth (1999) concluded, based on 74 experiments, that "no replicated study has made rationality violations disappear purely by raising incentives." The field experiment reported above, however, seemed to make the rationality violation of relative thinking disappear by introducing incentives.
Moreover, the results were replicated in two different locations and the hypothetical version showed that relative thinking does exist in this decision problem without financial incentives.
Nevertheless, it might be too early to conclude that relative thinking disappears with the introduction of financial incentives, because so far this is the only study that tests for relative thinking when presenting financial incentives. Possibly the small amounts of money involved in the purchase decision or the very cheap price of the bagel in the low-price treatment ($0.05) affect decisions in a certain way, and somewhat different results will be obtained in experiments involving larger amounts of money. I hope that this article will encourage others to design additional experiments that test for the effects of financial incentives on relative thinking, and will thus promote our knowledge of these effects further.
